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ABSTRACT 
 
Does the Quality of Industrial Relations Matter for the Macro 
Economy? A Cross-Country Analysis Using Strikes Data  
Using international data, we investigate whether the quality of industrial relations matters for the 
macro economy. We measure industrial relations inversely by strikes – which proxy we cross-
check with an industrial relations reputation indicator – and our macro performance outcome is 
the unemployment rate. Independent of the role of other institutions, good industrial relations do 
seem to matter: greater strike volume is associated with higher unemployment. Holding country 
effects constant, however, the sign of the variable is reversed. This fixed-effects result likely 
picks up a direct effect of strikes, namely, their tendency to rise when striking becomes more 
attractive to the union. 
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“What might lead to different speeds of learning and adjustment by unions? Bayesian 
learning points to differences in the tightness of priors, and the informativeness of 
signals. More generally, it points to differences in ideology and in the quality of 
industrial relations: The more unions and firms share a common economic model, or the 
more they discuss the economic implications of different shocks, the faster learning and 
adjustment is likely to be.” (Blanchard and Philippon, 2004, p. 11) 
 
The argument that the quality of labor relations matters for economic performance 
is widely encountered in the industrial relations literature even if it has proven difficult to 
sustain in practice. The best example is of course the ambiguous role of workplace 
governance on workplace performance. For example, using British WERS data, Fernie 
and Metcalf (1995) found that authoritarian workplaces performed better on some 
dimensions of firm performance than did the archetypal employee involvement 
workplace, while Wood and de Menezes (1998) reported that workplaces assessed to 
have high high commitment management were not more effective than their counterparts 
with medium-low, low-medium, and low levels of high commitment management along 
seven dimensions of work performance. Recent British work on social partnership 
agreements paints a somewhat more optimistic picture, although this may be premature 
(see, respectively, Metcalf, 2003; Kelly, 2004).  
For its part, the U.S. literature on employee involvement/high performance work 
practices also presents mixed results on the effects of labor management cooperation (for 
a review, see Addison, 2005). On the other hand, very recent analyses of strikes – long 
treated as an outcome indicator rather than an input – are offering interesting insights into 
the quality of industrial relations at the workplace and its effects on productivity (and 
practices such as TQM) and output quality (see Kleiner et al., 2002; Krueger and Mas, 
2004).1   
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There has been almost no attempt to factor the industrial relations climate into the 
determination of macro outcomes, even if industrial relations processes have not been 
neglected in that literature. Thus, the degree of centralization in collective bargaining and, 
latterly, the extent of coordination of the bargaining parties/process have recently been 
entered alongside (the monopoly arguments of) union coverage and union density as 
determinants of unemployment and employment (see section 2). In the most recent 
development, however, a measure of the climate of labor relations has been added to the 
growing number of collective bargaining variables in macro analysis.  
The new argument is a measure of strikes, a negative proxy for the “quality of 
labor relations.” Specifically, Blanchard and Philippon (2004) argue that, in countries 
where wages are largely determined by collective bargaining, the effects on 
unemployment of changes in the economic environment will depend in large part on the 
speed of learning of unions. This speed of learning is in turn seen as a reflection of the 
quality of the dialogue between the two sides, or the quality of industrial relations. The 
roles of the dialogue and labor market institutions are modeled principally in conjunction 
with economic shocks.  
The authors’ formal model illustrates how the effect of shocks on unemployment 
depends largely on whether and how fast they are perceived by unions. The model 
assumes an economy-wide union acting as a monopoly and seeking to maximize the 
wage bill period by period subject to a perceived labor demand. The actual labor demand 
is derived on the basis of a specific aggregate production function (incorporating Harrod-
neutral technological change) and a particular supply of capital function. The key 
parameters of the demand function are productivity, the response of the supply of capital 
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to net profit, and the firm’s user cost of capital. (As practical matter, the last two 
parameters are held constant.) Accordingly, the union chooses the wage unilaterally on 
the basis of its perceptions of these parameters. The level of employment is then set by 
firms on the basis of the actual demand schedule. If the union’s perceptions are correct, it 
follows that the economy will proceed along a balanced growth path where capital, 
output, and real wages grow in line with productivity and employment holds constant. 
Now, imposing a negative shock to productivity growth, employment will only remain 
constant if union perceptions adjust fully and wages adjust appropriately. If perceptions 
do not fully adjust, perceived productivity will exceed actual productivity and 
employment will be lower until the expected productivity converges back to actual 
productivity.  
Assuming stochastic productivity – where actual productivity equals underlying 
productivity plus white noise and where underlying productivity growth can either be 
positive or zero – unions will learn and adjust wages at a rate according to the tightness of 
their prior and the standard deviation of the transitory component. The authors simulate 
one such path of wage (and hence employment) adjustment for two such values and an 
assumed fall in underlying total factor productivity growth from 1 percent to 0 percent. 
For the parameters chosen it takes around 7 years for employment to return to its pre-
shock value. 
It follows that the speed of union learning and adjustment is crucial. The authors 
link this speed to the quality of the dialogue that unions have with firms or, equivalently, 
with the quality of labor relations. As an example of this they cite the case of the 
evolution of unemployment in the Netherlands since the Wassenaar Accord of the early 
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1980s, the so-called Dutch miracle (see Nickell and van Ours, 2000). Much more 
important than this ‘case study,’ however, is the authors’ empirical analysis of 
unemployment in 18 OECD nations over four decades of data, 1965-2003. The authors 
proxy the quality of industrial relations by (a) strike intensity from 1960 to 1967, as 
measured by the maximum of days lost and workers involved, both normalized by the 
cross country standard deviations,2  and (b) a direct measure based on the responses of 
managers in large firms in 1999 to a World Economic Forum question seeking to 
determine the extent to which labor relations in their firms were “cooperative,” on a scale 
from 1 to 7 (mean country response). They also use days lost per employee and workers 
involved in strikes in the 1960s to instrument for the 1999 survey measure.3 
 We summarize their full model below after having discussed the macro literature 
in which that model is located. We note here the results of the authors’ initial analysis. 
Simple bivariate regressions of unemployment on the three (fixed) measures of the 
quality of industrial relations for each of the four decades (1965-74, 1975-84, 1885-94, 
and 1995-2003) suggest that the quality of industrial relations does matter. Specifically, 
countries with a one standard deviation better quality had about 1 percent less 
unemployment than the average country in the first decade rising to 2-2.5 percent less in 
the last two decades.  If this result is robust the authors have uncovered an important 
additional influence of industrial relations – its quality and not just its structure – on a key 
macro indicator.  
In investigating these issues, the plan of the present treatment is as follows. In the 
next section, we present a brief background sketch of the particular macro literature in 
which the new industrial relations arguments are embedded and outline the more detailed 
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findings of Blanchard and Philippon. We next introduce the empirical models and the 
data used in this inquiry, before presenting our empirical results. Points of agreement and 
disagreement with Blanchard and Philippon are adumbrated in a concluding interpretative 
section.   
 
Background Literature 
The underlying macro-applied literature is the economics of employment 
protection. The starting point is Lazear’s (1990) parsimonious representation of the 
determinants of unemployment (as well as three other labor market aggregates – the 
employment-population ratio, the labor force participation rate, and average hours 
worked – all using the same arguments). Lazear’s key independent variable is a time-
varying measure of severance pay; specifically, the amount of statutory severance pay 
due to a blue-collar worker with 10 years of service dismissed for reasons unconnected 
with his or her behavior. The only other independent variables are a quadratic in time, the 
growth in per capita GDP (to accommodate the notion that a growing economy vitiates at 
least in part the probabilistic costs of severance pay), and a demographic control (the 
population of working age). Lazear reports that the more generous the severance pay 
entitlement, the greater is unemployment. These adverse effects are found to be 
especially serious in the cases of France, Portugal, and Italy.  
 Following Lazear, the literature developed in two main directions. First, there was 
search for a more inclusive measure of employment protection than just severance pay. 
This culminated in the well-known OECD (1994) rankings of the ‘strictness’ of 
employment protection legislation for regular contracts and fixed-term contracts (and 
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their composite). The regular contracts component included not only months of severance 
pay for no-fault dismissals but also procedural delays and other complications (such as 
prior authorization) before notice could be activated, as well as the perceived difficulty of 
dismissal as indexed by the legal conditions defining ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ dismissals (trial 
periods, compensation payable, and extent of reinstatement). The fixed-term contract 
component included the objective grounds for entering into such employment 
relationships (and permitted derogations), together with the maximum number of 
successive contracts and their maximum cumulated duration. Rankings for 16 countries 
were derived, pertaining to the “the late 1980s,” so that the price of inclusiveness was a 
single data point rather than the time-varying measure of Lazear. The OECD (1999) 
subsequently revised its overall and component measures of employment protection for 
“the late 1990s,” thus providing researchers with two data points – and for a modestly 
enlarged sample of 19 countries.4  
The second development was the inclusion of a wider range of regressors than 
considered by Lazear, omitted variables that might either bias the coefficient estimate for 
employment protection (by virtue of their correlation with that measure and the 
dependent variable) or which might otherwise amplify or reduce the effect of policy on 
economic aggregates (and hence reveal more than the simple ‘average effect’ of 
employment protection). Chief among these variables have been union arguments, 
aspects of the unemployment insurance system, the tax wedge, and active labor market 
policies (and, latterly, the degree of product market regulation).  
Collective bargaining arguments such as union density and union coverage have 
typically been included on the grounds that they are directly associated with pay, and 
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thence unemployment. Additional arguments based on centralization or coordination 
have a very different pedigree. Initially, it was argued that a more centralized bargaining 
framework should lead to improved employment outcomes vis-à-vis a less centralized 
(but not totally decentralized) system because the disemployment and price/tax 
consequences of excessive wage increases would be more transparent, leading unions to 
take account of the effects of wage increases on all workers (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). 
The result is a humped or inverse U-shaped relation between wage restraint and 
centralization – with full decentralization and centralization yielding equivalent 
outcomes, and sector-level bargaining (in association with high union density) producing 
the worst of all worlds.  More recently, researchers have increasingly relied on the notion 
of coordination, ostensibly because the underlying model relies more on behavior than 
the fact of centralization (e.g. Soskice, 1990; Nickell, 1997; Nickell and Layard, 1999).5 
The spirit of the literature is nicely captured in Nickell’s (1997, p. 68) dictum: “[U]nions 
are bad for jobs, but these bad effects can be nullified if both the unions and the 
employers can coordinate their wage bargaining activities.”   
Theory suggests that unemployment benefits clearly belong in employment 
equations irrespective of omitted variable bias (e.g. where systematic employment 
protection substitutes for unemployment insurance) or any moderating or amplifying 
effect benefits might may have on employment protection. Thus, more generous 
unemployment benefits lower the opportunity cost of unemployment and elevate wage 
pressure at the same time that they subsidize search. The upshot is higher equilibrium 
unemployment because of lengthened jobless duration. Ideally, the unemployment 
benefits measure should reflect the generosity of the UI system, including the maximum 
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duration of unemployment insurance benefits and any prolongation under separate 
unemployment assistance benefits. Practically, researchers have been able to draw on a 
cross-country summary measure provided by the OECD, based on an average of gross 
replacement rates for individuals with two earnings levels, three family situations, and 
three duration categories of unemployment (for odd numbered years).6 
Operating alongside unemployment benefits are measures that may have exactly 
the opposite effect on unemployment, namely, active labor market programs, operating 
directly on unemployment by improving search efficiency and indirectly by reducing 
wage pressure. Equally, they may not, most obviously perhaps where they signal future 
accommodation by the authorities to inflationary wage demands. Expenditures on active 
labor market policies are typically expressed as a percentage of GDP or as expenditures 
per unemployed individual relative to GDP per capita.7 
The final labor market institution identified here is the tax wedge, namely the gap 
between the gross labor costs to employers and the consumption wage paid to labor (i.e. 
the wage after deduction of direct and indirect taxes).8 This ‘institution’ may have little 
effect on unemployment, with the incidence falling mainly upon wages. On the other 
hand, if markets are imperfect there may be no offsetting wage cuts, while formal and 
implicit wage floors (set respectively by minimum wage legislation and social welfare 
provisions) will make labor taxes harmful to low-productivity workers. 
If the upshot of these post-Lazear innovations is mixed with respect to the impact 
of employment protection on unemployment (see Addison and Teixeira, 2003, pp. 105-
107), there is some agreement on the effect of the structure of collective bargaining and 
several of the other arguments. Thus, most studies report that increased coordination is 
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associated with lower unemployment, either independently or in conjunction with 
employment protection and adverse shocks (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Elmeskov et 
al., 1998; Nickell and Layard, 1999; OECD, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).9 By 
the same token, greater union coverage and higher union density are often associated with 
greater unemployment, although the relationships are often weak. Most of the other 
arguments noted above have the expected effects on unemployment.    
Blanchard and Philippon (2004) fit their ‘quality of labor relations’ model to data 
on joblessness for 18 countries, 1965-2003, using four decade-long averages of 
unemployment data. Their preferred specification allows the impact of a common 
(unobservable) aggregate shock to depend on a linear combination of nine institutions. In 
addition to the state of labor relations in 1999, instrumented by strikes in the 1960s, the 
institutions include all those mentioned above (as formally identified in Blanchard and 
Wolfers, 2000). They comprise fixed measures of employment protection, the UI 
replacement rate, the maximum duration of UI benefits, the tax wedge, active labor 
market policies, and the three collective bargaining measures (union coverage/density and 
the degree of coordination in collective bargaining). To repeat, in each case the measures 
are interacted with the time dummy variables since the maintained hypothesis is that the 
main route through which institutions impact employment is how well they mediate 
economic shocks.10  
Blanchard and Philippon find that cooperation in industrial relations in an 
equation containing just this argument and the three decade-long year dummies is 
negative and well determined; alternatively put, strikes are positively associated with 
unemployment. When the other eight institutional regressors are added to the equation, 
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the point estimate of cooperation in industrial relations falls somewhat in absolute 
magnitude but remains highly significant. No less interesting is the fact that the 
statistically significant and opposing effects of coordination and union density on 
unemployment – the former lowering joblessness and the latter elevating it – remain well 
determined. 
Blanchard and Philippon (2004, p. 17) conclude that the quality of industrial 
relations matters and that the influence is material. If this result proves robust, the authors 
have uncovered an important additional influence of industrial relations – its quality and 
not just its structure – on a key macro indicator in a framework that yields results for 
other arguments that are consistent with earlier research.  
 
The Model and Data 
Let us denote the key labor market performance indicator – unemployment – by y. 
Assuming that countries in the dataset are observed at different points in time, 
unemployment in country i in period t is then given by yit.  Further assume that in each 
country, at each data point, we observe a set of country-specific labor market institutions, 
Xitj, j=1, 2,…, k;  i=1,2,…, N ; and  t=1, 2, …, T. 
Within this panel data structure, several modelling strategies can be followed. One 
route is of course to use the full length of each country’s time-series at annual 
frequencies. Given serious data limitations, especially in gathering meaningful annual 
data on labor market institutions for a sufficiently representative set of countries, we 
cannot pursue this approach. But an interest in the long-term effects of institutions would 
anyway involve the use of longer time intervals than a year – to avoid contamination 
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from cyclical fluctuations – and so even if we had annual data we might seek to average it 
over intervals of five years or a decade.  
Measuring how institutions impact labor market outcomes is necessarily more 
subtle. It has typically been addressed in one of two alternative ways. First, it has been 
assumed that the role of any given labor market institution can be captured independently 
(or in interaction with other institutions) (e.g. Nickell, 1997; Belot and van Ours, 2004). 
Second, institutions may be depicted as interacting with shocks, either ameliorating or 
aggravating the impact of adverse exogenous shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). In 
this latter case, the impact of a shock can be modelled as a function of given set of 
institutions, yielding a nonlinear model in the parameters; whereas the former model is 
linear by definition and can be estimated using standard OLS techniques. Within these 
two approaches, the present paper assembles a new set of time-varying institutions, while 
inserting a new institution: the quality of labor relations.  
Formally, let us assume the following general empirical model11 
      itiitit ucXy ++= β ,               (1) 
where Xit includes all the relevant labor market institutional measures, ci is the cross-
section unobserved effect (or unobserved country heterogeneity), and uit is the 
idiosyncratic error, or disturbance, term, with E(ut |Xt, c) = 0. For convenience, further 
assume that Xit contains both time-invariant and time-varying variables, in addition to 
time (calendar) dummies. Interaction terms between institutions and between time and 
institutions can also be added to the specification. This model is linear in the parameters 
and the evaluation exercise will consist in obtaining an estimate ofβ . Obvious candidates 
are, respectively, the pooled OLS, fixed-effects, and random-effects estimators OLSβˆ , 
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FEβˆ , and REβˆ . In the spirit of Blanchard and Philippon (2004), if we for the moment 
neglect the fixed effects case by noting that the data are thin (occasioned by a short 
sample period – a maximum of six intervals – and modest changes in institutions through 
time), the main option is random effects (in the linear version of model (1)). This assumes 
that all cross-section heterogeneity will be picked up by the array of institutions, and that 
the unobserved effect ci is uncorrelated with the observed j labor market institutions. 
However, results from fitting the standard pooled OLS model will be used to provide a 
set of initial estimates.12 In this context, and again in the spirit of Blanchard and 
Philippon, we will also report results from a simpler exercise regressing the outcome 
variable (unemployment) on our indicator(s) of the quality of industrial relations in 
separate cross sections for each of the 5-year intervals making up our sample period. 
  Within the framework of model (1), the course of unemployment yit is explained 
by either changes in the Xj institutions or changes in common across-country shocks 
(proxied by time dummies). In principle, within-country changes in institutions are not 
well suited to explain differences in outcomes across time because of the persistence of 
institutions. In turn, common across-country shocks cannot of course explain differences 
between countries. Interactions between shocks and institutions thus emerge as the 
natural candidate to explain differences in labor market performance. The possibility that 
‘unfavorable’ institutions only reveal their true nature under adverse states of nature 
requires however a different modelling strategy, which can be translated into the 
following model (after Blanchard and Philippon, 2004, p. 15) 
it
k
j
jitjtTttit ubXdTdy +++++= ∑
=1
21 )1)(...2( θθθ ,       (2) 
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where the variables tt dTd ,...,2  denote time period dummies so that 1=tds  if s=t. (These 
variables are proxies for the unobserved common across-country shocks.) As in equation 
(1), the variables Xj can represent both time-invariant and time-varying institutions. 
Clearly, this model does not include any country dummies; nor does it permit the 
estimation of any ‘autonomous’ impact of institution j on yit. Rather, by specifying the 
impact of the time-specific shocks, Tsdst ,..,1, = , as a function of a linear combination of 
institutions, ∑ j jitjbX , the model concentrates fully on whether, say, a negative shock 
(one that increases unemployment) translates into more unemployment due the presence 
of institution j. Under model (2), therefore, if bj is positive and a given economy is hit by 
an adverse shock, then institution j ‘creates’ more unemployment. Correspondingly, if bj 
is negative, then institution j insulates the economy from any adverse shock, or at least 
softens its impact. The required technique to estimate the parameters of the model is of 
course nonlinear.13  
Subject to the caveats entered earlier, and as a final exercise, we will also examine 
models (1) and (2) in a fixed-effects framework, which for model (2) – the NLS case – 
amounts to simply adding country dummies. Further limitations of the fixed-effects 
estimator will also be noted.     
Our database contains six time-varying institutional indicators (and two 
alternative measures of the quality of labor relations) for 19 OECD countries: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The conventional labor market institutional variables are 
severance pay, the unemployment insurance replacement rate, union density, union 
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coverage, union and employer coordination, and the tax wedge. (The absence of active 
labor market policies and benefit duration from this list is explained by the lack of time 
series information for these arguments.)  The manner in which we obtain six 5-year 
averages for each variable is outlined in Appendix Table 1. Further, as in Blanchard and 
Philippon (2004), the variables are defined in such a way that an increase in a particular 
measure is expected to increase unemployment, which means in particular that the 
coordination measure is multiplied by -1. Table 1 provides the corresponding country 
means, with the sample period being divided into six 5-year periods from 1970-99 
(namely, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-99, 1990-1994, and 1995-99). 
(Table 1 near here) 
         We will use two proxies for the quality of labor relations. Our main measure is the 
strike rate (or ‘strike volume’ as it is sometimes known), namely, the number of days not 
worked per thousand paid employees. This ratio is based on revisions to the raw 
International Labor Office series on strikes (contained in the Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics, Tables 9A-D) kindly made available by Claus Schnabel of the University of 
Erlangen-Nürnberg. The data is available on an annual basis and is grouped into 5-year 
averages. Our second proxy is a direct, survey-based indicator of the quality of industrial 
relations. It is taken from the World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000, published by the 
International Institute for Management Development (IMD), Switzerland. In the IMD 
survey, national respondents are asked to rate the state of industrial relations on a scale 
ranging from 1 (“hostile”) to 10 (“productive”).  Unlike the indirect measure of the 
quality of industrial relations, this indicator is solely time invariant – since publication of 
the IMD index started only in 1989.  
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 (Figure 1 near here) 
          Figure 1 charts the course of the strike rate/volume over time for all countries in the 
sample, again for 5-year intervals. Although there is a considerable decrease in strike 
activity over time, it is also the case that countries show stability in their relative 
positions. Taking all possible combinations between 5-year periods (15 in total), the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients always exceed 0.8, other than for those involving 
the last five-year interval, where the estimates fall in 0.5-0.7 range.  
 
Findings  
Estimates of the basic Blanchard-Philippon model containing just the quality of 
labor relations variables is given in Table 2 for six separate cross sections of the data. In 
the first row of the table, the strikes measure differs over each 5-year period, unlike in 
Blanchard and Philippon, where it remains fixed (at its level for 1960-67). In the second 
row, however, the direct reputational (i.e. survey) measure is fixed at its 2000 reported 
value throughout, so that only the unemployment rate changes. The same is true for the 
instrumented for the degree of cooperation in industrial relations in the last row. To 
control for potential reverse causality – the course of unemployment over the period 
perhaps influencing the perceptions of survey respondents as to the quality of industrial 
relations – we also instrumented the IMD index by the observed strike rate/volume in the 
70s, 80s, and early 90s. (Use of the strike rate in the 70s as an instrument, as well average 
strike volume over the sample period, produced no material change in the results.) 
(Table 2 near here) 
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Our findings accord with those reported by Blanchard and Philippon (2005, Table 
1); specifically, greater strike volume is associated with heightened unemployment, while 
the direct survey measure(s) of the quality of labor relations is associated with reduced 
joblessness. As can be seen, most of the coefficient estimates are well determined, with 
the main exception of that for the indirect measure in the most recent 5-year interval. We 
note that the same broad findings hold when we ran separate regressions by decade – as 
do Blanchard and Phillipon – using two clouds of data for each decade.14 
(Table 3 near here) 
Table 3 gives results from using all our labor market indicators for the full sample 
period, 1970-99. Separate results are given for the strikes proxy and for the direct 
measure of the quality of industrial relations. Note that each measure is time invariant, 
strikes now being set at their average value over the six 5-year periods (although this 
restriction will subsequently be relaxed). All other labor market institutions are time-
varying. The general finding is that Blanchard and Philippon’s conjectures again hold up 
rather well. Thus for the pooled OLS estimates it can be seen that the strike rate is 
positively associated with unemployment and the survey measure (of the degree of 
cooperation in industrial relations) is negatively associated with unemployment. The 
coefficient estimates for both arguments are well determined. Of the other institutional 
influences, the effects of higher replacement rates and greater coordination in collective 
bargaining are as expected – recall that the coordination score has been multiplied by -1 – 
and the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels. But 
although the effect of higher levels of union coverage (one of the two monopoly union 
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arguments) is of the expected sign, this is not the case for the other monopoly union 
measure. 
The estimates reported in columns (1) through (3) of Table 3 assume away 
unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. Since application of the standard Breusch-Pagan 
test rejected the null of constant variance of the error term (homoskedasticity), we re-
estimated the base model using random effects. The GLS estimates provided in the next 
three columns of the table again support Blanchard and Philippon’s conjectures as to the 
impact of good industrial relations on unemployment. Again the coefficients on the strike 
and reputation measures are of the expected sign and remain well determined. The 
performance of the labor-market institutions proper also improves somewhat, although 
the perverse effects of union density persist. 
The estimates in the last three columns of Table 3 return us to Blanchard and 
Philippon’s preferred specification, conforming to our equation (2). As can be seen, the 
effect of the labor market institutions proper further strengthens. And again the two 
measures of the industrial relations climate operate in the hypothesized manner, with 
strikes adversely impacting the effect of negative shocks and cooperation in industrial 
relations ameliorating them. 
(Table 4 near here) 
Table 4 repeats the regressions in columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 3, substituting 
the 5-year, time-varying strikes measure for the measure in which strikes are averaged 
over the six 5-year periods. The coefficient estimate for strike rate/volume is no longer 
statistically significant in the random effects GLS specification but remains well 
 19 
determined in Blanchard and Philippon’s preferred specification (i.e. the NLS estimates 
in column (3) of the table).  
(Table 5 near here) 
Thus far, our results offer not unimpressive support for the notion that good 
industrial relations – proxied inversely by strike volume or directly via a reputation 
measure of the degree of cooperation in industrial relations – do matter in influencing 
unemployment, either independently or taken in conjunction with economic shocks. In 
Table 5, we investigate whether the above relationships still hold when we control for 
country effects.  Blanchard and Philippon do not consider fixed effects specifications 
because of the fixed nature of their proxy(ies) for the state of labor relations.15  In the first 
column of the table, we provide fixed effects estimates of the basic model, and in second 
column we add country dummies to the (NLS) specification in which institutions interact 
with shocks. The results are dramatic. In particular, although the strike rate remains 
highly statistically significant its sign is reversed: strike volume is now negatively 
associated with unemployment. Also the performance of the institutional variables 
deteriorates vis-à-vis the results in Tables 3 and 4.  
Although this reversal of the Blanchard-Philippon dictum is at first sight 
troubling, we think the change in sign of the coefficient of the strikes variable may be 
explained in one of two ways. First, we would argue that use of a time-varying measure 
of strikes may pick up cyclical influences necessarily ignored in Blanchard and 
Philippon’s treatment but long emphasized in the micro strikes literature. Thus, for 
example, in Ashenfelter and Johnson’s (1969) early model of strikes the higher is the 
union’s minimum acceptable wage increase (and the higher its rate of concession), the 
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more likely are strikes. Ashenfelter and Johnson conjecture that the union’s minimum 
acceptable wage increase is a negative function of the unemployment rate. Although there 
are problems with this one-sided political model of strikes, the evidence continues to 
suggest that that strike frequency is procyclical, consistent with the findings in Table 5 
(e.g. Hirsch and Addison, 1987; Cramton and Tracy, 2003). The caveat is that the strikes 
measure in the present study is a conflation of frequency and duration, and it may be the 
case that strike duration is countercyclical – although contrary evidence, at least for large 
strikes, is provided by Harrison and Stewart (1993). If strike volume is indeed procyclical 
this might explain the negative association between this time-varying measure and 
unemployment. Equally, by the same token, it can play no part in an empirical application 
in which strike volume averaged over 1960-67 is used to predict unemployment in 
subsequent decades and indeed the quality of industrial relations in the late 1990s.   
Measurement error in the RHS variables may, however, call into question these 
estimates and our interpretation of them. Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) have recently argued 
that, in such circumstances, the between effects (BE) estimator – that is, the OLS 
estimator applied to a single-cross-section of variables averaged over time may 
outperform the fixed-effects estimator by averaging out measurement errors. In 
recognition of this possibility, the final column in Table 3 contains results for the BE 
estimator. The results for the strikes variable are striking: its coefficient estimate rate 
changes in sign, and is once again positive and well determined. All other variables with 
the exception of the union density covariate have the expected signs.  
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Conclusions 
 
In an important departure, it has recently been argued by Blanchard and Philippon 
(2004) that what is good for industrial relations might after all be good for performance, 
this time at the macro level. Suggesting that the quality of industrial relations might be 
(inversely) proxied by strikes, these authors were able to find strong support for their 
claim that ‘quality’ matters in unemployment determination. For example, one of their 
findings is that countries with one standard deviation better quality had enjoyed 2 to 2.5 
percent lower unemployment over the course of the last two decades, ceteris paribus. 
Moreover, they reported that this quality effect operated over and above the benefits 
conveyed by greater union and employer coordination in collective bargaining. 
In the present treatment, we further investigated the quality issue. Our innovations 
included the use of annual strike data (and strike data averaged over the sample period 
rather than being set at beginning-of-period values or indeed earlier), the derivation of a 
direct moment-in-time indicator of labor relations supported by different survey data, and 
the construction and deployment of time-varying institutional variables. The Blanchard-
Philippon hypothesis was found to hold up really rather well. Higher strike volume 
averaged over the sample period and greater cooperation in industrial relations at end 
period were found to be related to the macro performance indicator in the manner these 
authors hypothesized. Allowing strike volume to vary through time, and not just 
institutional innovations, weakened but did not overturn the Blanchard-Philippon result 
for their preferred model.  
The fly in the ointment was occasioned by the within estimator. That is to say, 
when we introduced country dummies, the sign of the relation between strikes and 
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unemployment abruptly reversed itself. However, drawing on the micro strikes literature, 
we argued that this result likely reflected the dominance of cyclical over any longer-term 
influences. Nevertheless this sensitivity requires further examination than provided here 
because there are enough hints in national experience to suggest that the quality of 
industrial relations can vary materially, and because the focus on the unemployment 
outcome might be unduly restrictive. The contribution of measurement error is another 
issue. But in the interstices we have been able to adduce real support for the recherché 
notion of the potential importance of trust between the ‘two sides of industry,’ namely, 
that countries with better industrial relations may be able to limit the rise in 
unemployment and recover faster.  
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Endnotes 
1. Strikes are of course not the only measure of industrial relations quality/performance. 
Another is grievances. Two early studies of General Motors plants and of ten paper mills 
found that the number of grievances was inversely related to productivity (see, 
respectively, Katz et al., 1983; Ichniowski, 1984). A review of the earlier literature on the 
relationship between labor-management conflict and firm performance, is provided by 
Belman (1992).   
2. The use of the max specification is justified on the grounds that both measures are 
likely to be lower bounds on strike activity. 
3. The use of IV analysis is justified on the grounds that reverse causality attaches to this 
more direct measure of industrial relations quality: the evolution of employment might 
condition attitudes as to the quality of industrial relations.   
4. Other indicators of employment protection are available from surveys of employers. 
One such survey is the World Competitiveness Report (WCR), utilized below. This 
covers some 21 countries and inquires of top management a large number of questions 
concerning national competitiveness. An overall index of competitiveness is provided and 
is the weighted linear sum of the components. Research has tended to focus on responses 
to individual questions in the WCR concerning the market friendliness of economic 
institutions, as indexed by the flexibility of the enterprise to adjust job security and 
compensation standards to economic realities (e.g. Di Tella and MacCulloch, 1999). 
5. Other analysts have deployed both centralization and coordination regressors (see 
Scarpetta, 1996; Elmeskov et al., 1998; OECD, 1999). 
6. There is unfortunately no parallel time series information on the maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits. 
7. Since spending on active measures is endogenous it is conventional to characterize the 
variable as a fixed effect, instrumenting it by the average spending over the sample 
period.  
8. Additional variables used in the literature include cyclical variables (proxied by the 
inflation rate or the output gap), barriers to geographic mobility (proxied by extent of 
home ownership), the stance of macroeconomic policy, controls for the terms of trade and 
real interest rates, and product market competition. Product market regulation has been 
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used as a regressor in studies of employment rather than unemployment (e.g. Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta, 2001). And most recently attention has shifted to the issue of fundamental 
rather than proximate causation and to the endogeneity of labor market institutions (e.g. 
Botero et al., 2004). 
9. For a treatment that downplays the role of direct effects and elevates the role of 
combinations of institutions (and policies), see Belot and van Ours’ (2004) analysis of 
unemployment (and nonemployment) in 19 OECD countries, 1960-99. Among other 
relationships, the authors report a positive interaction between union density and 
centralization and a negative interaction between employment protection and 
centralization.  
10. Note that all measures of labor market institutions are defined such that an increase in 
the measure is expected to increase the effect of an adverse shock, requiring in the case of 
active labor market policies and degree of coordination that the measures are multiplied 
by -1.  
11. This general specification can be designated as an Unobserved Effects Model (UEM) 
(Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 10). 
12. Pooled OLS assumes away unobserved effects ci. Under the assumption that E(X’it ci) 
= 0, the pooled OLS estimator is consistent but the error term will be serially correlated 
due to the presence of the time-invariant component ci. Inference based on pooled OLS 
will then require robust standard errors. The random effects implementation of model (1) 
assumes E(X’it ci) = 0 and exploits the serial correlation in the composite error, eit=ci+uit, 
in a generalized least squares (GLS) framework. 
13. From model (2) above, the partial effect of Xj on y is given by: 
js
j
bcX
X
yE *),|( θ=∂
∂ , for a given year s, s = 1, 2, …, T. 
14. The point estimate of the strikes measure was strongly statistically significant in the 
1970s and 1990s, although not the 1980s, while the coefficients for the direct measures 
were well determined throughout. 
15. In particular, their strike measure is based on beginning of period values for 1960-67 
on the grounds that it precedes the rise in unemployment they are seeking to explain. 
They add (Blanchard and Philippon, 2004, p. 11) that “the reason for stopping in 1967, 
 25 
rather than, say, 1970, is that, in the late 1970s, many European countries, especially 
France, Germany, and Italy, were affected by social and political unrest, for reasons 
largely unrelated to the quality of industrial relations.” 
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Table 1: Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions (Country Means, 1970-99) 
 
(1) (2) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6 (7) 
Quality of labor relations 
 
Unemployment 
rate 
Replacement 
rate 
Union 
coverage 
Union density Tax wedge Union and 
employer 
coordination 
Severance 
pay Strike 
rate/volume 
Cooperation in 
industrial relations 
Australia 0.067 20.7 3 45.4 29 1.9 1 369.4 6.2 
Austria 0.029 27.7 3 54.1 54.1 3 2.1 5.6 7.7 
Belgium 0.082 43.0 3 51.3 59.7 2 0 143.1 5.9 
Denmark 0.064 46.7 3 69.8 62.7 2.3 0 202.4 7.9 
Finland 0.068 23.0 3 66.0 53.7 2 0 396.1 7.4 
France 0.080 30.3 3 16.6 54.7 2 0.9 160.6 4.4 
Germany 0.058 28.7 3 33.3 54.0 3 0 30.0 6.7 
Ireland 0.112 24.7 3 53.2 52.0 2 1.4 418.9 7.3 
Italy 0.092 2.0 3 41.4 54.7 1.7 7.0 764.0 5.0 
Japan 0.024 10.0 1 30.2 24.3 3 0 45.5 7.6 
The Netherlands 0.065 49.0 3 33.0 56.0 2 0 25.6 8.2 
New Zealand 0.043 26.7 1.8 46.8 35.0 1.3 3.3 321.6 7.1 
Norway 0.032 24.3 3 55.1 62.3 2.5 0 75.2 7.7 
Portugal 0.059 14.3 3 51.3 41.0 2 7.9 97.2 6.2 
Spain 0.141 24.3 3 17.5 43.0 2 5.8 581.2 5.4 
Switzerland 0.013 12.0 2 29.4 39.3 2 0 1.3 8.6 
Sweden 0.039 19.7 3 78.2 60.3 2.3 0 92.4 7.8 
United Kingdom 0.070 22.3 2.7 43.8 45.3 1.3 2.5 310.8 7.0 
United States 0.064 12.3 1 20.4 36 1 0 223.6 6.6 
Sources: The material in columns (1) through (5) is based on the definitions in Appendix Table 1; severance pay in column (6) is based on the Lazear (1990) measure; data on 
strike volume in column (7) was kindly provided by Claus Schnabel of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg; and the index of cooperation in industrial relations, also in column 
(7), was taken from The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000 (International Institute for Management Development, Switzerland). 
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Table 2: Unemployment and the Quality of Labor Relations, Separate Cross-Section Regressions (six 5-
year periods, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, and 1995-99).  
(Dependent variable: unemployment rate. The quality of labor relations is proxied by the strike rate/volume 
and by the IMD index of cooperation in industrial relations.) 
 
Time period  
 1970-74 1975-79 1980-1984 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
Strike rate/volume 
 
0.00003 
(3.90) 
F(1,16)=15.2 
0.000026 
(2.40) 
F(1,17)=5.75 
 
0.00006 
(1.94) 
F(1,17)=3.76 
0.0012 
(2.23) 
F(1,17)=4.99 
0.0003 
(6.28) 
F(1,17)=39.4 
0.0002 
(1.63) 
F(1,17)=2.66 
Cooperation in 
industrial relations 
 
-0.0071 
(2.27) 
F(1,17)=5.13 
-0.011 
(2.45) 
F(1,17)=6.0 
 
-0.0187 
(2.63) 
F(1,17)=6.92 
-0.0256 
(2.94) 
F(1,17)=8.67 
-0.019 
(2.50) 
F(1,17)=6.26 
-0.022 
(3.34) 
F(1,17)=11.16 
Cooperation in 
industrial relations 
(instrumented) 
-0.0172 
(2.81) 
F(1,17)=7.92 
-0.0213 
(2.71) 
F(1,17)=7.32 
-0.035 
(2.79) 
F(1,17)=7.79 
-0.0506 
(3.14) 
F(1,17)=9.86 
-0.0377 
(2.92) 
F(1,17)=8.52 
-0.0326 
(3.08) 
F(1,17)=9.49 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
Notes: The general model specification is given by  yi = a + bxi + ei, where the dependent variable, 
unemployment (yi), is simply a function of the selected index of the quality of labor relations (xi). In row 3 
the IMD index was instrumented by the observed strike volume in the 70s, 80s, and early 90s. The number 
of countries in the sample is 19 (18 in 1970-74, row 1).  
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Table 3: Unemployment and the Quality of Labor Relations, 1970-99, 5-Year Averages. 
(Dependent variable: unemployment rate. The quality of labor relations is proxied by the strike rate/volume 
and by the IMD index of cooperation in industrial relations.)  
 
Pooled OLS Random Effects (GLS) Nonlinear least squares (NLS) 
  
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
 
Severance pay 
 
0.0029    
(0.0026) 
0.0018   
(0.0013) 
0.0026 
 (0.0015) 
0.0031 
(0.0015) 
0.0019 
(0.0015) 
0.0026 
(0.0015) 
0.0410 
(0.0178) 
0.0173 
(0.0158) 
0.0332 
(0.0179) 
Replacement rate 
 
0.0004   
(0.0004) 
0.0008    
(0.0004) 
0.00058   
 (0.00024) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0007   
 (0.0003) 
0.00052  
 (0.00027) 
0.0070 
(0.0042) 
0.0138 
(0.0039) 
0.0111 
(0.0045) 
Union density 
 
-0.0006 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006 
(0.0002) 
-0.00034  
(0.00027) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005 
(0.0002) 
-0.00016 
 (0.00034) 
-0.0099 
(0.0023) 
-0.0093 
(0.0020) 
-0.0051 
(0.0029) 
Union coverage 
 
0.0176 
 (0.0059) 
0.0080 
(0.0065) 
0.0099 
  (0.0056) 
0.0156 
(0.0074) 
0.0076    
(0.0064) 
0.0072 
(0.0081) 
0.2790 
(0.0922) 
0.1490 
(0.0838) 
0.1711 
(0.1015) 
Union and 
employer 
coordination 
0.0145  
 (0.0052) 
0.0015    
(0.0068) 
0.0108 
 (0.0039) 
0.0137 
(0.0058) 
0.0018 
(0.0061) 
0.0092 
(0.0054) 
0.2168 
(0.0818) 
0.0212 
(0.0781) 
0.1668 
(0.0051) 
Tax wedge 
 
0.000006 
(0.0003) 
0.00008   
(0.0003) 
0.00002   
(0.00021) 
0.00005 
(0.0004) 
0.0001  
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.00009 
(0.00509) 
0.0002 
(0.0044) 
-0.0013 
(0.0051) 
Strike rate 
(over time average) 
 
 0.00009 
(0.00003) 
  0.00009 
(0.00003) 
  0.0014 
(0.0003) 
 
Cooperation in 
Industrial relations 
 
  -0.0093    
(0.0036) 
  -0.0116 
(0.0050) 
  -0.1616 
(0.0620) 
R2 0.56 0.66 0.59 0.55 0.66 0.58 0.60 0.72 0.63 
Wald χ2    106.5 121.05 134.38    
F 14.95 41.0 13.37    10.74 16.85 11.25 
N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: The general specification of the model in columns (1)-(6) is given by equation (1) in the 
text, while in columns (7)-(9) it is given by equation (2). Sources and definitions of labor market 
institutions are given in Appendix Table 1. The sample period contains six 5-year data points, 
ranging from 1970-74 to 1995-99, and (a maximum of) nineteen countries (unbalanced panel). 
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Table 4: Unemployment and the Quality of Labor Relations, 1970-99, 5-year Averages. 
(Dependent variable: unemployment rate. The quality of labor relations is proxied by the strike 
rate/volume.)  
 
Pooled OLS 
 
Random Effects (GLS) Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Severance pay 
0.0030 
(0.0024) 
0.0035 
(0.0017) 
0.0335 
(0.0177) 
Replacement rate 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0071 
(0.0041) 
Union density 
-0.0006 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005 
(0.0002) 
-0.0010 
(0.0022) 
Union coverage 
0.0134 
(0.0055) 
0.0152 
(0.0063) 
0.2269 
(0.0941) 
Union and employer 
coordination 
0.0106 
(0.0054) 
0.0133 
(0.0057) 
0.1615 
(0.8249) 
Tax wedge 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.00009 
(0.0003) 
0.0018 
(0.0051) 
Strike rate 
 
0.000019 
(0.000011) 
0.0000003 
(0.00001) 
0.0005 
(0.0002) 
R2 0.57   
Wald χ2  0.55 0.61 
F 21.23 109.3 10.20 
N 91 91 91 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. 
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Table 5: Unemployment and the Quality of Labor Relations, 1970-99, 5-year Averages, Fixed Effects, 
Nonlinear Least Squares with Country Dummies, and Between Effects Estimation.  
(Dependent variable: unemployment rate. The quality of labor relations is proxied by the strike 
rate/volume.) 
 
Fixed Effects (FE) Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) 
 
Between Effects (BE) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) 
Severance pay 
-0.00018 
(0.0038) 
0.1628 
(0.0640) 
0.0017 
(0.0018) 
Replacement rate 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0287 
(0.0086) 
0.0011 
  (0.00047) 
Union density 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0057) 
-0.00059 
(0.00026) 
Union coverage 
0.0118 
(0.0126) 
0.3053 
(0.2313) 
0.0059 
(0.0104) 
 
Union and employer 
coordination 
0.0181 
(0.0116) 
0.2552 
(0.2026) 
-0.00081 
(0.0096) 
Tax wedge 
0.0017 
(0.0010) 
-0.0147 
(0.0113) 
0.000009 
(0.00056) 
Strike rate 
-0.00004 
(0.000019) 
-0.0014 
(0.0004) 
0.000104 
(0.0000281) 
    
R2 0.62   0.86 0.85 
F 7.53  14.16 6.43 
N 91 91 19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: The general specification of the model in column (1) is given by equation (1) in the text, 
while in column (2) it is given by equation (2), with country dummies added to the specification. 
Column (3) presents the between effects estimation. Sources and definitions of labor market 
institutions are given in Appendix Table 1. The sample period comprises six 5-year data points, 
from 1970-74 to 1995-99, and (a maximum of) nineteen countries (unbalanced panel). 
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Appendix Table 1: Description of Institutional Variables  
Variable/source 
Definition/range Raw year/period Interpolated periods 
Employment protection (EPL) Fixed measure (OECD, 1994, 
Table 6.7). 
Ranking of employment protection legislation by “strictness”. It is 
an average country ranking based on four different indicators, 
where 1 denotes the least rigidity. 
1985-93 1970-99, five-year periods. 
1971 1970-74; 1975-79 
1981 1980-84; 1985-89 
Time-varying (OECD, 1994, Table 
8.B.1). 
Summary measure of benefit entitlements on a gross basis. 
1991 1990-94; 1995-99 
Replacement rate (unemployment 
insurance replacement rate) (UIRR) 
 
 
Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
Share of past earnings replaced by unemployment benefits. 1983-88 and 1989-94 1970-99, five-year periods. 
 
1970 1970-74; 1975-79 
1980 1980-84; 1985-89 
1990 1990-94 
Time-varying measure (OECD, 
1997, Table 3.3). 
Trade union density. 
1994 1995-99 
Union density (UDEN) 
Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000. 
Trade union density. 1983-88 and 1989-94 1970-99, five-year periods. 
 
1980 1970-74; 1975-79; 1980-84; 
1985-89 
Time-varying measure (OECD, 
1997, Table 3.3). 
1990 1990-94 
1994 1995-99 
Union coverage (UCOV) 
 
 
 Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000. 
Share of workers covered by union bargaining: 1 denotes less than 
25 percent; 2 means from 25 to 75 percent; and 3 indicates over 70 
percent. 
1983-88 and 1989-94 1970-99, five-year periods. 
1980 1970-74; 1975-79; 1980-84; 
1985-89 
1990 1990-94 
Time-varying measure (OECD, 
1997, Table 3.3). 
Employer and union coordination in bargaining. It is assigned a 
value of 1 if there is no economy-wide coordination/centralization 
up to 3 if the degree of coordination/centralization is very high. 
1994 1995-99 
Union and employer coordination 
(TCOOR) 
 
 
Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000. 
Employer and employee coordination in bargaining. It is coded  
between 2 and 6 in ascending order (the sum of employer and 
employee coordination). 
1983-88 and 1989-94 1970-99, five-year periods. 
 
1978 1970-74; 1975-79 
1985 1980-84; 1985-89 
Time-varying measure (OECD, 
1997, Table 25). 
Overall tax wedge (in percentage of average production worker 
earnings). 
1994 1990-94; 1995-99 
Tax wedge (TXWEDGE) 
Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000. 
Tax burden. It is measured as the sum of the average payroll, 
income, and consumption tax rates. 
1983-88 and 1989-94 1970-99, five-year periods. 
 
Notes: The data on the fixed measures denoted by * was downloaded from http://www.mit.edu/blanchar/www.articles.html. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) take a  
simple average of Nickell’s (1997) original data over two periods, 1983-88 and 1989-94. Time-varying measures based on authors’ own calculations.  
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Figure 1: Strike Rate/Volume in the Sample of OECD Countries 
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Notes: Strike rate/volume is given by the ratio of days not worked per thousand paid employees. 
The raw annual data on strikes is based on a revised version of the ILO series (Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics, Tables 9A-D), kindly made available by Claus Schnabel. The height of each column 
gives the average strike rate over five years for each of the six 5-year periods in the sample, 
beginning with 1970-74 and ending with 1995-99. 
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